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Abstract
The recent decade has witnessed the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes as a tool of 
China’s public diplomacy. Ironically, the institutes created to eliminate the anxiety about 
China’s economic and military rise produce new worries about their political influence in 
recipient countries, especially in the USA and other western countries. In contrast, some 
other countries have perceived the program more positively. Previous studies highlight 
the U.S. cases. Instead, this article turns to the other side, particularly, Thailand where the 
Confucius program is extensively welcomed. Based on the empirical study of Thai case 
and incorporation previous findings in the USA, it reveals an huge perception disparity 
between the USA and Thailand, rising from their respective context. Thailand has the 
world’s largest Chinese community. Before Confucius Institutes, Thai Chinese have been 
active in promoting Chinese language and culture for long. Furthermore, the leaders of 
the Chinese community have acted as lobbyists, negotiators, and funders as well as 
directors in the development of the Thai Confucius program. However, the traditional 
culture promoted by Confucius Institutes fails to win the heart and mind of overseas 
Chinese in Thailand. Theoretically, the realist and liberalist approach is helpful to explain 
the Confucius Institutes’ dilemma in western countries, but it fails to understand its 
popularity in other regions. Moreover, public diplomacy initiated by non-democracies like 
China has challenged the existing public diplomacy framework that is understood in a 
democratic ideal. The study of Thai Confucius Institutes demonstrates that China’s public 
diplomacy is a hybrid framework of traditional and new public diplomacy, which is 
integrating into China’s broader traditional diplomacy to adapt to the dynamic and diverse 
local context. 
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1. Introduction
The rise of China has been one of the most remarkable transformations of the international 
landscape for the past three decades. China’s dramatic increase in economic power and military 
might has raised huge concerns on its implication to the world. Particularly, it contributes to a has 
growing belief that a rising China will be a threat to the established order. Hu Jintao administration 
put forward terms of Peaceful Rise/Development (Bonnie; Medeiros 2007) and Harmonious World 
(Zheng; Tok 2007) while the incumbent Xi Jinping further proposed to pursue peaceful development 
to realize the Chinese Dream (Wang 2014), to counter against China threat theory. Overall, the 
Chinese government seeks to use these political slogans to send a message that a growing China 
will not be a threat to the world. On one side, the Chinese leadership has realized the value of 
Chinese language and culture, especially for the traditional culture, in communicating with the 
international public to ease the anxiety over China’s rise. On the other hand, China’s economic 
success has led to a surging interest in learning the Chinese language. The two factors combined 
gave rise to the idea of establishing an overseas agency to promote Chinese language and culture 
overseas. 
Learning from the experience of UK, France, Germany, and Spain, Confucius Institute 
Headquarters (Hanban)1was established in Beijing in 2003 and followed with the establishment of 
the world’s first Confucius Institute in Seoul in 2004 as well as the world’s first Confucius Classroom 
in Thailand in 2006. The operation and management of both Confucius Institute and Classroom are 
under the charge of Hanban which is affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education. Confucius 
Institute is named after Confucius, a great philosopher in ancient China. The core of Confucianism 
is He (harmony or harmonization), and China expects to promote this concept to reassure other 
countries of its peaceful development. By 2017, 525 Confucius Institutes and 1113 Confucius Class-
rooms have thrived in 146 countries and regions (Hanban 2018). In line with the rise of these insti-
tutes, incredible financial investment flood into the host countries where Confucius Institutes are 
located. The expenditure of Confucius Institutes has increased significantly since 2010, reaching 
314,116 thousand US dollars in 2016 (ibid). Approximately 85% of the expenditure is on the start-up 
funds and daily operation for Confucius Institutes. For the rest, it is distributed to the scholarships, 
research grants, teachers’ training, teaching materials, and books (Hanban 2016).
The rapid increase of the Chinese government-sponsored project produced a fear for China’s 
cultural influence in the area where the Institutes and Classrooms are the most intensified, 
including the USA, UK, Australia, and Canada. They either suspect them of being ?China’s foreign 
propagandists? (Brady 2008, p.159) or view them as ?a threat to academic freedom? (Sahlins 2015, 
p.1). In contrast, Stambach (2014) points out the importance of Confucius Institutes as financial 
support when American public universities suffer a lack of fund. Likewise, King (2013) contends 
that the budget provided by these institutes help foster Chinese language education in Africa. 
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Tangyuenyong and Choonharuangdej (n.d.) emphasize the significance of the Chinese language in 
the world increasingly dominated by China and mastering Chinese can prepare young generation 
access to the global market. These polarized perceptions of Confucius Institutes caused 
considerable confusion over its nature. 
2. Literature Review 
The importance of public diplomacy is closely associated with the U.S. experience in cold war and 
9/11 in which the foreign public opinion has grown to be a significant power. In the context of 
nuclear threat in cold war, the USA and Soviet Union preferred public diplomacy as a new weapon 
with less destructive power considering that the foreign public opinion of a country has been vital to 
shape its government’s policies (Malone 1985, p.199). With the fall of the Soviet Union, public 
diplomacy suffered a downturn. Yet, the break-out of 9/11 has warned the USA of its image problem 
in the Muslim world and called for a need of an effective public diplomacy to create understanding 
and support among muslim countries of the military action in Afghanistan. Rather than one-way 
persuasion, we see a rise of new public diplomacy that involves non-state actors to engage in 
two-way dialogue and collaboration (Pamment 2013). 
Theoretically, realism and liberalism in international relations offer us two prominent approaches 
to understand the importance of public diplomacy. Realists believe that sovereign states are 
principal actors in international relations. Secondly, states are rational and act for national interest 
and states tend to compete are willing to use forces (Morgenthau 1958). The result of the inter-
action of states is a zero-sum game in which one state wins while its rival loses. Realists have been 
long aware of the importance of public opinion but argue for the close association between ?power 
over opinion? and military and economic power (Carr 1939). In addition, realists stress the 
dominant role of states in the practice of public diplomacy. Carr is dismissive of the power of 
opinion when it is not supported by states. Stephen Walt argues that perceived ?legitimacy of U.S. 
primacy? around the world is important for U.S. efforts to gain ?active cooperation from other 
states?(Walt 2005, p.165, p.176). 
Nevertheless, the liberal theory put more emphasis on the role of non-state actors and transna-
tional influence. Liberalism argues that non-state actors are also significant and have an impact on 
other countries without using hard power. This influence can be peaceful and result from internal 
structures and policies (Katzenstein 1976). States can cooperate and obtain a win-win situation. 
Regarding ?power over opinion,? Nye (2004) developed this notion and put forward ?soft power,? 
which is defined as a country’s ability to get what it wants through appeal and attraction rather than 
coercion or payments.  Credibility is emphasized by liberalists. Nye argues that not only the dissem-
ination of information matters but also the information ?to be believed? due to the issue of 
?continual contest for legitimacy? in the post 9/11 era (Nye 2004, p.28, p.31). Liberalists assert that 
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democratic states are highly unlikely to go to war. Accordingly, the democratic peace theory is 
manifested in their understanding of public diplomacy. ?Skillfully conducted and adequately 
resourced, this ?new diplomacy’- of which public diplomacy has become an integral part-will 
continue to contribute toward a safer and more peaceful world? (Roberst 2006, p.12). 
In practice, Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) find that U.S. leadership appears to increasingly make 
efforts to communicate directly with foreign audiences through public speeches and appearances, 
as well as through other information and citizen-exchange programs. According to Gilboa (2008), 
cultural diplomacy, exchanges, and branding are the most appropriate tools to build a long-term 
relationship. Despite their close ties with the government, NGOs are the most effective bodies to 
undertake long-term tasks. Advocacy, international broadcasting and cyber public diplomacy are 
designed for immediate reaction in the information age while international public relations, 
corporate diplomacy and diaspora public diplomacy aimed at intermediate results. Confucius Insti-
tutes is one of the instruments of public diplomacy. Specifically, it is cultural diplomacy, which is 
defined as ?an exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture between countries to 
facilitate mutual understanding?(Cummings 2003, p.1). Its ultimate aim is to familiarize foreign 
recipients with the country, its inhabitants, culture, language, and to create a positive image of the 
country via its culture. Confucius Institute is not the first in welding the power of culture and 
language teaching to attract the foreign public. Its forebears include the British Council, the Goethe 
Institute of Germany and the Alliance Française.
Opinions were divided as to the rise of Confucius Institutes in the existing literature. Some 
scholars hold a negative perspective towards the global expansion of Confucius Institutes because 
of its affiliation with the Chinese government. These institutes are either regarded as ?China’s 
foreign propagandists?(Brady 2008, p.159 ) or ?cultural crusades?(Young 2009, p.8). Sahlins 
(2014) see them as ?academic malware,? accusing them of undermining academic freedom. 
Paradise (2008) noticed the great amount of money provided by Hanban and potential influence in 
teaching and other language and cultural promotion and argues that Confucius program is not 
entirely a soft power strategy and it relies on payments. On the contrary, Stambach (2014) points 
out the importance of Confucius Institutes’ financial support for underfunded American universities. 
This view is shared by King, who argues that Confucius Institutes are demand-driven and there is 
no evidence of a unified curriculum and textbooks from Hanban (King 2013, p.156). It seems to be a 
win-win result for both China and other recipient countries. Hartig (2015) argues that by utilizing 
the current global fascination with Chinese language and culture, the Chinese government has 
found interested and willing international partners to co-finance the Confucius Institutes and further 
to fund China’s international charm offensive partially. 
Previous studies of Confucius Institutes focus intensively on the cases in the USA and other 
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western countries, which brings about three problems. Firstly, they have paid close attention to the 
intention of the Chinese government, and thus the recipient dimension is ignored. As Sun (2013) 
argues that the receiving sides’ historical experience and the wooing countries’ existing image 
constitute recipient context, which in turn shapes the wooing countries’ strategies. Rather than 
China’s unilateral ambition, the institutes’ dramatic increase is the result of an interaction between 
China as a providing side and other countries as a receiving end. Another problem is that the 
western experience does not necessarily mirror the concern of other regions with a less different 
political value from China. Lastly, the debate on propaganda and soft power prevailing in the study 
of Confucius Institutes is insufficient to analyze the complexities of China’s public diplomacy 
strategy, neither. 
3. Research Aim and Research Method
Given the importance of recipient context, this study deals with a case that is entirely different 
from the U.S. experience. Thailand, where is home to the largest Chinese community in the world. 
Overseas Chinese have been the pioneers to facilitate Chinese language education in Thailand. 
Also, the political concern does not bother Thailand, and China has much less difficulty in finding 
willing receivers in Thailand than in the USA. Thai Confucius Institutes have gained incredible 
support from Thai royal families, the Thai government and the local Chinese community in 
Thailand. Thai cooperation with Hanban dated back to 2003 when Hanban dispatched a group of 
Chinese teachers as a tentative effort for the launch of Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program in 2004 
to guarantee a sustainable supply of Chinese teachers for the operation of Confucius Institutes. 
Thailand is so far the largest recipient country for Chinese teachers in the world. Meanwhile, 
Thailand owns the world’s first Confucius Classroom of Thai Trimit High School in Bangkok set up 
in 2006. These are interesting facts that previous studies fail to notice. By introducing Thai case 
with a unique background, this study expects to shed fresh lights on the nature of Confucius Insti-
tutes under the framework of public diplomacy. Additionally, it intends to identify the different 
challenges and problems faced with Confucius Institutes in places like Thailand where the political 
concern is not an obstacle. The last aim is to manifest the theoretical implications of Confucius Insti-
tutes on the framework of public diplomacy. 
To realize the goals, this paper will examine the origins, actors, activities, and targets of 
Confucius Institutes in Thailand and explore their characteristics that are different from other 
counterparts as well as the challenges posed to them in Thailand. Despite a single-case study, the 
previous findings in other regions will be incorporated to facilitate more reliable arguments. 
Methodologically, the study reviews various types of document, official reports from Hanban’s 
website, academic papers, books, and non-academic publications. What’s more, empirical data is 
primarily collected from semi-structured interviews and field trips. The interviewees are divided into 
two groups: (1) people in charge of Confucius Institutes including 1 Chinese official in Hanban 
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Thailand office, 2 Thai principles of Chinese school with cooperation with Hanban, 3 Thai directors 
and 4 Chinese directors of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, a group of Chinese teachers (5 
from China and 4 from Thailand); (2) participants of Confucius Institutes activities including 5 Thai 
students, 3 staffs working in Chinese-related business, 2 Thai officials invited for Hanban conference 
in Beijing. Accordingly, I have visited 4 Confucius Institutes, 3 Confucius Classrooms and 2 Chinese 
schools receiving Chinese teachers sent by Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program in Bangkok, 
Chonburi, Chiang Mai, Mae Sot, and Udon Thani.
4. Findings
4.1 Origins
Thailand owns the world’s largest Chinese community, and Chinese migrants have made 
enormous efforts to promote Chinese language education and protect Chinese culture and tradition. 
Due to the Thai government’s fluctuating policy, Chinese language education had undergone ups 
and downs. Chinese immigration to Thailand started as early as the 13th Century, and the most 
significant wave took place in the latter half of the 19th century (Chansiri 2008). As substantial 
numbers of ethnic Chinese settled, Chinese language education began to develop in Thailand. In 
the early 20th century, Chinese schools increased steadily. Although the Thai government promul-
gated several acts and regulations to restrict to learn Chinese, its laxity in enforcing these policies 
resulted in a sharp increase in Chinese schools. According to the Thai Ministry of Education, there 
were 30 Chinese schools in 1920 and surged to 188 in 1928. By 1937, the number had reached its 
peak of around 300 (Li 2012). 
In the following Phibun Administration spanning 1938-1944 and 1948-1954, Chinese language 
education, however, suffered a devastating blow because of the Thai government’s promotion of 
nationalism and assimilation policies as well as concerns about the spread of communism through 
Chinese teaching and learning. Only two Chinese schools remained open in Thailand by 1944(ibid). 
After Phibun stepped down from office, new Thai government adopted a moderate policy towards 
overseas Chinese and its language, but the situation did not improve significantly until the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and China in 1975. China withdrew its support 
for the Communist Party of Thailand. As a result, the Thai government’s blame on the political 
function of the Chinese language has lost its ground. Furthermore, China’s economic reform opened 
its door to the world for business and trade, creating a high demand for people who can speak 
Chinese in Thailand’s commercial and trade areas which are dominated by ethnic Chinese. Therefore, 
the Chinese community lobby the Thai government for a policy change. In 1992, Thai cabinet passed 
a resolution concerning on foreign language teaching and officially lifted the restrictions against 
Chinese language education in Thailand. For the first time in history, learning Chinese has gained 
momentum not only among the Chinese community but also in the whole society. Other than Chinese 
schools, Thai schools, international schools, colleges, and universities all start to offer Chinese class.
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The restrictions of almost half century have caused a short of qualified Chinese teachers and 
textbooks. Thai official firstly attempted to reach the Chinese side through the meeting of leaders of 
the Chinese community held by Qiaoban.2 In the meeting, Thai representatives of the Chinese 
community had expressed Thailand ’s willingness to learn Chinese and the difficulties it 
encountered. The former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin also mentioned the problems of Chinese 
language education of Thailand to the then premier Zhu Rongji in his state visit to China in 2001 and 
called for assistance in providing Chinese teachers from China. In response, Hanban sent the first 
batch of volunteer teachers to Thailand in 2003, and the number has soared to 1506 in 2017. From 
2003 to 2018, more than 10,000 Chinese volunteer teachers have been dispatched to over 1000 Thai 
schools and universities, making Thailand the world’s largest recipient country of Chinese volunteer 
teachers (Hanban Office in Thailand 2017). Thailand’s cooperation with Hanban in Chinese 
Volunteer Teacher Program has built mutual trust in China’s language teaching and learning 
initiative.3 Not surprisingly, the Confucius Institutes in Thailand are chiefly opened as early as 2006 
whereas others were still hesitating to apply for it. Plus, Overseas Chinese in Thailand’s long-term 
engagement in Chinese language education plays a more extraordinary role in facilitating the 
development of the Confucius Classroom in Thailand, and many of the classrooms are set up in 
Chinese schools. The leaders of Overseas Chinese not only serve as lobbyists to persuade the Thai 
government to cancel the restriction on Chinese language education. Also, they have been 
appointed as representatives to Beijing to negotiate about the Chinese language education 
cooperation between Thailand and China.  
4.2 Main Actors, Activities and Targets
As a language and culture center, British Council and Goethe Institute are registered as interna-
tional NGOs. Unlikely, Confucius Institutes are directly under the charge of the Chinese 
government. The financial budget is from the Ministry of Finance of China. Concerning the institu-
tional arrangement, Confucius Institute is founded and overseen by Hanban which is composed of 
members from the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture and the 
State Council. Apartment from that, the leadership of Hanban is appointed and approved by the 
State Council which is the chief administrative body of China. The set-up of Communist Party 
Committee suggests a firm control from the government. Nevertheless, the Chinese government is 
not the only actor in the operation of Confucius Institute because of the joint-venture form created 
by Hanban. Thai and Chinese Ministry of Education are co-responsible for the project. 
 
The bilateral cooperation between Chinese and Thai universities and schools is under the 
guidance of Hanban. Hanban is in charge of funding and supervising Thai side provides an 
independent building and necessary facilities while Chinese partner offers Chinese teachers and 
textbooks. In each Confucius Institute/Classroom, there is one director from Thailand and the 
other from China co-managing the daily operation of these institutes. Chinese Teachers are also 
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from both sides. The program is also supported the Thai royal family, especially the Princess 
Sirindhorn. In 2007, a Confucius Institute was established in the Princess’s alma mater and also the 
most prestigious university in Thailand- Chulalongkorn University, which is in sharp contrast with 
the situation in the USA that rare Confucius Institutes are opened in the Ivy League except for 
Columbia. Apart from the Chinese and Thai government, universities and schools, the Thai royal 
family, the Chinese community in Thailand has also played a crucial part, especially the leaders. 
They have directly involved in the program by either providing fund or acting as a director in the 
Confucius Institutes/Classroom. 
To promote Chinese language and culture, various programs and activities are organized apart 
from daily teaching on campus. They are generally categorized into three aspects: Chinese 
language teaching and training, cultural promotion, and education exchange. Firstly, Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms teach students Chinese in Thai universities or schools. Some courses are 
non-credit while others are accredited depending on institutions. Furthermore, they provide a short-
term or long-term training program for local teachers and local Chinese learners beyond students. 
They cover from senior officers, staffs of the local government and companies to ordinary Thai 
people. Secondly, culture promotion is another important agenda. In practice, the activities focus 
more on traditional culture. Chinese teachers also teach students Chinese culture skills, including 
opera, acrobatics, calligraphy, Chinese dancing, paper cutting, Chinese knotting, and Chinese Gong 
Fu. With a target for the broader local community and the foreign public, massive culture events are 
held during traditional Chinese festivals, such as the Spring Festival and Mid-Autumn Festival. 
Lastly, Confucius Institutes and Classrooms play an active role in facilitating cooperation and 
exchange between Chinese and Thai schools and universities into a more extensive area. 
Meanwhile, they are developing into an important platform to disseminate information about 
Confucius Institute Scholarships, Chinese language test, and competition. Hanban (2018) has 
recently set up ?Confucius China Studies Program,? composed of six subprograms in the academic 
areas of Humanities and Social Sciences to foster China studies.
So far, 35 Confucius Institutes and Classrooms together with thousands of Chinese teachers from 
China have formed an extensive network to cover the most modernized Bangkok to the rural area 
of Northeast and the deep South of Thailand. All these institutes conduct similar activities, however, 
with different characteristics. For example, located in Suanchitralada Palace,4 Confucius Classroom 
at Chitralada School has gained tremendous support from the Thai royal family; In Chonburi, 
Confucius Institute in Burapha University emphasizes Chinese medicine promotion. Confucius 
Institute in Assumption University is featured with Chinese business teaching; Confucius Institute 
in Phuket utilizes its tourist resources to develop varieties of Chinese tourism courses; Confucius 
Institute at Betong Municipality is the only Institute cooperating with Betong Municipality instead 
of Thai university. Given its proximity to Malaysia, this Institute aims to facilitate the regional 
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cooperation for Chinese teaching. The activities and targets of Confucius Institutes in Thailand are 
similar to those in the USA, but the main actors are different. There is no evidence of the 
engagement of the U.S. government and Chinese community in the USA. 
4.3 Joint-Venture: Double-Edged Sword
Another salient feature that is different from their counterparts in other countries is that 
Confucius Institutes is joint-venture form. The language and cultural programs run by British 
Council and Goethe Institute are independent from local influence while Confucius Institutes aspire 
to cooperate with local partners and operated directly in foreign campus. Joint-venture is a 
partnership between Hanban, a Chinese and foreign university. Chinese side provides a co-director, 
teachers, and teaching materials and foreign partners offer venues, facilities, and local staffs. The 
budget is from Hanban. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish it is whether a Chinese or local institution. 
Furthermore, joint-venture creates a two-way communication for both sides with the directors, 
teachers, staffs from both sides, making it difficult for Confucius Institutes to be a one-dimensional 
propaganda tool. As one Chinese director put in the interview, ?Hanban stressed that the Chinese 
side should not intervene in local teaching since Thai partners are more familiar with local students 
and regulations than us. Regarding the textbooks, teaching hours and content, it depends on them.? 
During the trip to one Confucius Institute in Bangkok, it was found that Chinese teachers prefer 
textbooks from Taiwan and Singapore rather than those provided by Hanban because these books 
have been used for a long time and both teachers and students are getting used to them. 
King (2013) also points out that there is no evidence of a unified curriculum and textbooks from 
Hanban in his study of cases in Africa. As for co-management, there is no strict line for the Chinese 
and Thai directors. In most cases, Chinese directors are in charge of language teaching and coordi-
nation with Hanban while Thai directors are dealing with budget affairs. It would be too easy to 
conclude that whether the partnership created by joint-venture is equal or not. ?We (Chinese 
director) are contract-based staff sent by our home universities in China and work here at most four 
years. Instead, they are full-time staffs in this (Thai) university. Every year, Hanban will evaluate our 
performance, and Thai partner’s view plays a significant role in deciding whether we (both Chinese 
director and Chinese teachers) can continue our contract?, said one of the Chinese directors in the 
interview. With the belief that the success of foreign-located Confucius Institutes rests more with 
partners in host countries than the Chinese side, Hanban always reminds the Chinese directors and 
teachers to maintain a good relationship with Thai partners. The joint-venture approach, on the plus 
side, enables China to find interested international foreign partners to co-fund the Confucius Insti-
tutes. On the minus hand, China seems to cede some power and influence (Hartig 2015, p.188). 
Although the joint-venture approach is recognized in previous studies(King 2013; Hartig 2015), its 
weakness is not extensively discussed. Only a few scholars notice the negative side of it. Confucius 
Institutes’ operation in foreign universities and schools has aroused tremendous concern on their 
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impact on academic freedom that is prevalently valued in western countries. Ding (2014) mentioned 
the case of Canada since Confucius Institutes Project was suspended in 2013. One of the Committee 
members of the Canadian Association of University Teachers explained, ?Confucius Institutes are 
built in the foreign campus so that they use the facilities of the universities and provide courses 
accredited by the university. As a result, the foreign public may misunderstand that all the opinions, 
regulations, and teaching content of Confucius Institutes are also accepted by the university. The 
Canadian side is reluctant to take risks if the regulations of the Institutes go against the law or the 
norm of Canada? (Ding 2014, p.83). Another problem posed by joint-venture is the difficulty in 
evaluating the teaching of Confucius Institutes since the activities of Confucius Institutes have been 
part of local Chinese teaching and learning. Confucius Institutes and Classrooms do not have their 
students. In the Confucius Institute at Burapha University, the students are from the faculty of 
Foreign Languages. As for teaching curriculum and teaching plan, Chinese teachers usually follow 
the faculty. Therefore, it is difficult to separate the teaching effect of Confucius Institute from the 
Faculty of Foreign Language of Burapha University.
4.4 Problems and Issues
4.4.1 Chinese Language Teaching
Rather than the quantity of Confucius Institutes that the USA emphasizes, their quality problem is 
a great concern in the Thai case. The institutes have two major problems with regards to Chinese 
teachers and teaching management. Firstly, the Chinese teachers sent from China are newly 
graduated college students who have no teaching experience. Although these teachers are provided 
a short-term training, it is not that effective. ?The training is organized by selected Chinese univer-
sities; some of them palter with this job due to a lack of supervision from Hanban. For us (Chinese 
teachers), it is as challenging to accommodate themselves to a new environment as teach Thai 
students,? said by one Chinese volunteer teacher. In addition to that, three Thai directors and 
teachers commonly mentioned in the interview that ?the selection standard does not meet the need 
of local teaching.? Too much emphasis is put on foreign language ability so that teaching ability 
turns to be subordinate. Another big concern shared by all the interviewees is the high turnover of 
Chinese teachers. According to Hanban (2018), Chinese teachers work based on a one-year 
contract and is allowed to work in the same school or university for only three years. For this 
reason, Chinese teaching suffers from a discontinuity. Thai students also complain that it is hard to 
build up a close relationship with teachers.
The Chinese teaching is problematic, too. First, the Chinese school board is short of experience 
in managing Chinese language education, merely emphasizing the quantity at the price of the 
quality of Chinese class. No systematic evaluation and unified teaching curriculum plan is in place 
probably because the Chinese language is not on the list of Thai entrance exam. In some of the Thai 
schools, the Chinese language is nothing but a publicity stunt to lure students and parents. Second, 
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it demonstrates an imbalanced development of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms in Thailand 
owning to divergent attitudes and agendas of Thai schools and universities. The classrooms built in 
Chinese schools have developed the best thanks to the immense support of local Thai Chinese, 
whereas some Thai schools do not manage very well and most International schools in Thailand are 
not very interested in Confucius project. So far, only one international school established Confucius 
Classroom in 2009. For the rest, they even do not receive Chinese teachers from Hanban ?since 
they worry about the quality,? said a Chinese teacher working in an international school.
4.4.2 Chinese Culture Promotion
Culture promotion is a more critical agenda to reach a broader international public beyond 
Chinese language learners in the campus. It further connects with China’s public diplomacy’s goal 
to present China’s positive image to the world through its cultural attraction. Generally, Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms have two evident problems in spreading Chinese culture in Thailand. One 
problem is that the activities highlighting traditional culture appears less popular than they are in 
the USA and other countries that are not familiar with China’s culture and history. The other is a 
gap between China’s cultural promotion discourse and Chinese culture practiced in local Thai 
society among Thai Chinese. Firstly, the priority on traditional culture may work well in America, 
Europe or Africa, but faces some challenges in places that were historically under the influence of 
Chinese culture in Asia, especially for Southeast Asia- the region with influential overseas Chinese 
society. Thai Chinese is the most overseas Chinese group in Asia and the world, too. It turns out 
that Chinese traditional culture seems not so appealing to Thai young generation that some of the 
cultural activities do not have sufficient participants or audiences in the university. A Thai student 
said that the cultural events organized by Confucius Institutes/Classrooms are similar as what she 
had learned from a Chinese teacher in a private language center and some of them are also 
practiced in her family with a Chinese background during spring festival. The practitioners have 
also realized the problem. Nevertheless, a Chinese director points out the dilemma, ?we have no 
choice but to resort to traditional culture because our popular cultural products are even less 
attractive for Thai people.? A shortage of attractive popular cultural products is not only a problem 
of Confucius project but also the cultural industry of China. 
Another problem concerning Chinese culture promotion in Thailand is that the Chinese culture 
that Confucius Institutes/Classrooms promote might not correspond with the expectations of the 
Chinese community in Thailand. Hanban does not specify which aspect of Chinese culture it intends 
to promote and focus solely on the ?shell or some forms of Chinese traditional culture such as 
making dumplings or Chinese paper cutting,? one leader of the Chinese community in Thailand 
complained. Nonetheless, the Thai Chinese community stresses the role of religion in Chinese 
culture. The belief here he mentioned is Chinese Buddhism. For overseas Chinese in Thailand, 
they are mainly Teochew, Hainanese, Hokkien, and Cantonese from the South coast of China. 
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These different speech groups had integrated after the Second World War and formed a distinctive 
Thai Chinese culture in which the core is to respect for their ancestors and their death practice. In 
Thailand, Chinese temples, Chinese graves, and Chinese schools are indispensable components of 
Chinese culture in Thai Chinese’s perspective. On the contrary, the Chinese Community Party is 
atheistic. For Chinese culture, the least emphasized by the Chinese government is the religion in 
China. Consequently, the Chinese government does not regard religion as part of Chinese culture 
promotion efforts, and Chinese teachers in Confucius Institutes/Classrooms do not understand the 
culture of local Thai Chinese society. Despite, it implies high flexibility and adaptability of China’s 
Confucius Project to accommodate the local context. According to Hanban, Chinese teachers are 
required to respect local culture and participated in regional rituals, such as offering sacrifices to 
gods. 
5. Conclusion
Concerning the dominance of the USA and other western countries in the case study of Confucius 
Institutes, the article has selected a case with a different context and perspective-Thailand. First, 
there is no voice of objection for Confucius Institutes/Classrooms in any form. Second, Thailand 
has the world’s largest Chinese community. Before the arrival of Hanban, overseas Chinese have 
been the primary actor to promote Chinese language and culture. Drawing on empirical data from 
the interviews and field trips to Thailand, this study has examined various aspects of Thai Confucius 
Institutes/Classrooms as China’s important instrument of public diplomacy including the actors, 
targets, activities, characteristics, and problems that varies from previous findings from other 
regions, particularly the USA. Firstly, the program’s affiliation with the Chinese government has 
triggered a widespread criticism on its political influence whereas Thailand stresses the economic 
benefit brought from learning Chinese and takes advantage of the program to fund its Chinese 
teaching and learning. Secondly, joint-venture is welcomed in Thailand because it empowers the 
Thai sides in the operation of the program, but it contributes to a fear that the Chinese 
government’s political influence will penetrate directly in the western campus and undermine 
academic freedom. Another difference is that the USA is uneasy about the substantial quantity of 
the institutes while Thailand concerns more about the quality. 
Furthermore, the Chinese community plays a remarkable role that is absent in the U.S. case. The 
leader of overseas Chinese not only served as a lobbyist to persuade the Thai government to reopen 
Chinese courses but also sent to the negotiating table in Beijing when the Thai government seeks 
for cooperation with China about Chinese language education. Besides, they have been active 
supporters for the program to co-manage its daily operation. On the negative side, Hanban’s priority 
on traditional culture strategy fails to take account into the perspectives of the Thai Chinese 
although it works well in the USA. The study of Thai Confucius program has posed two theoretical 
challenges to the existing public diplomacy framework dominated by western democratic 
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experience. Confucius Institutes has emerged in the context of a dichotomy of traditional-new 
public diplomacy. New public diplomacy sees the government’s engagement in public diplomacy 
more critically. Therefore, the government-funded Confucius program is suspected to be a manipu-
lative propaganda tool of the Chinese government. In traditional public diplomacy, the realist 
approach took the upper hand and peaked in cold war. It seems that the Chinese government’s 
control on Confucius Institutes would not be a problem since realism believes that public diplomacy 
can be pursued only by the government. Despite, it is a problem. China is a communist country, and 
the cold war is an ideological conflict between western democracy and eastern communist. 
Therefore, what matters is not the government but the nature of the government. 
Liberalist and realist approaches may be helpful to understand the western countries’ negative 
perception of Confucius Institutes, but they can not explain their success in Thailand. Confucius 
program also faces another legitimacy issue. As an authoritarian regime, the Chinese government’s 
initiation of Confucius Institutes has challenged the liberalist view of public diplomacy, which is 
understood with a democratic premise. Overall, the Confucius Institutes program has revealed the 
multi-dimensionality of China’s public diplomacy. First, the institutes’ affiliation with the Chinese 
government makes it fall into the scope of traditional state-centric public diplomacy. Conversely, 
given the involvement of domestic and foreign non-government institutions, Confucius Institutes 
tend to be new public diplomacy which includes non-state actors and emphasizes two-way communi-
cation. On top of that, the Confucius program appears to be state-to-state cooperation in light of the 
involvement of the Thailand Ministry of Education and China counterpart. 
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Note
1 Hanban is the colloquial abbreviation for the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign 
Language affiliated with the Ministry of Education, China. It is responsible for Chinese teaching for foreign 
students in China and Chinese language and culture promotion abroad. With the development of Confucius 
Institute project, Hanban was named as Confucius Institute Headquarters externally. In China, it remains to 
be called Hanban.
2 Qiaoban is the colloquial abbreviation for the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China. It mainly deals with overseas Chinese affairs. One of its functions is to support 
overseas Chinese language schools. With the set-up of Hanban in 2003, Qiaoban’s role in Chinese language 
school has continued, however, declined. 
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3 Interview with a Chinese official in Hanban Thailand Office, Bangkok, Thailand, December 21, 2015.
4 Suan Chitralada Palace is the unofficial permanent residence of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) and 
Queen Sirikit. Chitralada School was initially established in 1958 in this palace for the children of the royal 
family and palace staffs. Confucius Classroom opened at this school on June 12, 2009, with a partnership of 
Affiliated High School of Peking University in Beijing, China.
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